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CASE NOTES
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
ACTION-I) ABSENT COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES,
A REVIEWING COURT MAY NOT REQUIRE INFORMAL
RULEMAKING PROCEDURES THAT EXCEED THOSE
REQUIRED BY SECTION 553 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT-2) AGENCIES MAY PLACE REASONABLE LIMITATIONS ON THE CONSIDERATION OF
ALTERNATIVES PROPOSED UNDER THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT-Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519 (1978).
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,' the United States Supreme
Court reversed two separate decisions of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. The opinion concerns particular responsibilities of administrative agencies under two
federal statutes-the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 2
and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).3 The portion of the opinion which reviews Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission considers whether
courts may require rulemaking procedures in excess of those
guaranteed by section 553 of the APA.' The portion of the
opinion devoted to Aeschliman v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission considers when NEPA requires administrative
agencies to consider alternatives to agency action proposed by
outside parties.'
© 1979 by Allan F. Wichelman.
1. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). The decision was unanimous, Justices Blackmun and
Powell not participating. It reviews the decisions in Natural Resources Defense Council
v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), and Aeschliman v.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). Rulemaking under § 553 requires notice in the Federal
Register in most cases and an opportunity for "interested persons ...
to participate
in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or
without opportunity for oral presentation."
5. Section 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976), requires "all agencies of the Federal
Government" to include in any recommendation or report for legislation or major
federal action "a detailed statement" on "[a]lternatives to the proposed action."
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Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
In 1967, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission' granted Vermont Yankee Power Corporation a permit to build a nuclear
power plant in Vernon, Vermont. When Vermont Yankee applied for an operating license several years later, the Natural
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) objected on environmental
grounds. A hearing on the license application was held before
the Commission's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board at which
the board refused to consider the environmental effects of fuel
reprocessing disposal operations. The Commission upheld this
ruling.
Shortly thereafter, the Commission instituted rulemaking
proceedings on the question of whether the environmental effects of fuel reprocessing and waste disposal should be included
in the Commission's cost-benefit analysis for nuclear reactor
licensing. The Commission held a public hearing at which written and oral statements were received from all interested parties, but at which discovery and cross-examination were not
permitted.'
After the conclusion of the hearing, the Commission issued
a rule requiring a quantitative evaluation of the environmental
effects of fuel reprocessing and disposal to be included in the
cost-benefit analysis for each operating license. The Commission also approved the procedures which had been used at the
hearing on the rule.
The NRDC appealed both the rule promulgated by the
Commission and the Commission's issuance of Vermont Yankee's operating license. The court of appeals struck down the
rule and remanded the operating license to the Commission for
additional proceedings.'

The appellate court held that, absent an effective rule, the
6. The licensing and regulatory functions of the Atomic Energy Commission were
transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by the Energy Reorganization Act
of 1974, § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 5841(f) (1976). Hereinafter both the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will be referred to as the
"Commission."
7. See 37 Fed. Reg. 24191 (1972). The Commission's procedures differed from the
basic format established under § 553 of the APA to the extent that the Commission
provided for oral testimony and questioning of participants by the hearing panel, and
made available in advance, documentation forming some part of the factual basis of
the rule. A later notice specifically precluded cross-examination. 38 Fed. Reg. 49
(1973).
8. 547 F.2d at 641, 655.
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Commission must consider the environmental impact of fuel
reprocessing and disposal in each individual licensing proceeding.' Since the court of appeals found that the rulemaking procedures were insufficient for "ventilation of the issues,"' 0 it also
invalidated the rule. In reaching this conclusion, the court of
appeals decided that the Commission failed to utilize the procedural devices available to it in a "sensitive, deliberate manner" and, as a consequence, the rulemaking record failed to
fully develop the factual issues presented."
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, reversed and remanded. Initially, he found that the appellate
court's decision rested primarily on what it perceived to be
inadequacies in the Commission's rulemaking procedures
rather than in any inadequacies in the rulemaking record." In
so doing, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the court had overstepped its powers.
Justice Rehnquist declared that a reviewing court may
scrutinize the record to determine whether the agency has fulfilled its statutory obligations. It may not, however, require
procedures other than those mandated by statute, at least not
in the absence of "constitutional constraints" or "extremely
compelling circumstances. '""
The Court rested that part of its decision on the traditional
judicial view of the administrative process. Under this view, an
administrative agency is considered the best architect of its
own rulemaking procedures." The Constitution, the APA, and
the agency's own enabling legislation simply set down certain
minimal procedures which the agency must follow. But
whether the agency utilizes any additional procedures, under
this view, is entirely within the agency's discretion.' 5
The Court's view represents a significant departure from
recent decisions by the courts of appeals,' and from some
9. Id.at 641.
10. Id. at 644, 654 n.58.
11. Id. at 653-54.
12. 435 U.S. at 540-41.
13. Id. at 543.
14. Id. at 544.
15. Id. at 546.
16. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 629-31, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 503 (4th Cir. 1973); Walter Holm & Co.
v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359
F.2d 624, 632-33 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
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scholarly analyses.' 7 The decisions have suggested that, under
certain circumstances, procedures in excess of those required
by the APA might be"necessary to ensure thorough discussion
and public disclosure. Courts have suggested, for example, that
trial-type procedures, including cross-examination, might be
required when rulemaking involves issues that are technically
complex and of great public importance.' 8 Justice Rehnquist
agreed that additional procedures sometimes might be appropriate, but states that the imposition of these procedures must
remain with the agencies and not the courts.'9 Any other course
of action would "seriously knterfere with [the] process prescribed by Congress.""0
In contrast, Judge Bazelon of the court of appeals attempted to offer reviewing courts a middle ground. Although
he carefully avoided dictating to the Commission what specific
procedures they should follow on remand, he indicated that a
reviewing court should nonetheless make its own determination of whether agency procedures provide "a meaningful opportunity [for participation] in the proceedings as guaranteed
by due process." 2' Justice Rehnquist's opinion, on the other
hand, limited a reviewing court's scrutiny to whether the
agency had complied with the procedures mandated by the
APA, other statutes, and the Constitution unless "extremely
compelling circumstances" are present.2 The latter exception
seems to be a narrow one, possibly limited to cases where
17. See, e.g., Williams, Hybrid Rulemaking Under the AdministrativeProcedure
Act: A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis,42 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 401 (1975); Claggett, Informal
Action-Adjudication-Rulemaking: Some Recent Developments in FederalAdministrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51, 78. But see Wright, Court of Appeals Review of
Federal Regulatory Agency Rulemaking, 26 ADMiN. L. REV. 199 (1974); Wright, The
Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L.
REv. 375 (1974); Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185,
234-49 (1974); Note, The Judicial Role in Defining Procedural Requirements for
Agency Rulemaking, 87 HARV. L. REv. 782 (1974); Hamilton, Proceduresfor the Adoption of Rules of GeneralApplicability: The Need for ProceduralInnovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAUF. L. REv. 1276, 1313-30 (1972).
18. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d at 631 ("A right of
cross-examination, consistent with time limitations, might well extend to particular
cases of need, on critical points where the general procedure proved inadequate to
probe 'soft' and sensitive subjects and witnesses."); Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449
F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 632-33, cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
19. 435 U.S. at 546.
20. Id. at 548.
21. 547 F.2d at 643.
22. 435 U.S. at 543.
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agency rulemaking has departed grossly from well-established
prior agency practices. 23
Justice Rehnquist expressed concern that if reviewing
courts have free reign to impose supplemental procedures on
remand, agencies might take a defensive posture and require
the full panoply of trial-type procedures in most rulemaking
proceedings. This result would create uncertainty and undermine section 553 of the APA, which establishes "the maximum
procedural requiremeits which Congress was willing to have
the courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking proceedings."2 Since rulemaking under section 553 need not rest
exclusively on information obtained through a hearing, it is
unreasonable to expect a direct correlation between the adequacy of the rulemaking record and the type of procedural
devices employed at a rulemaking hearing if, in fact, one is held
at all.2 5
Admittedly the federal courts may not be well-equipped to
second guess an agency about which procedures would be best
for particular rulemaking proeedings. Commentators have
argued, however, that the federal courts are the institution of
government most politically able to determine whether policy
issues of great importance have been accorded more than summary treatment in agency rulemaking.26 Because the legislative
and administrative processes are responsive mainly to shortterm, exigent, and politically expedient considerations, they
are not always sensitive to the longer-term implications of the
choices agencies make. The appellate courts which have scrutinized rulemaking records in the past to determine the adequacy of the procedures used have occasionally been able to
moderate precipitious agency action. 27 Vermont Yankee calls
an abrupt end to this development. Reviewing courts are
warned not to "explore the procedural format" utilized by an
agency nor "to impose upon the agency [the court's] notion
of which procedures are 'best' or most likely to further some
23. Id. at 542.
24. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
25. 435 U.S. at 546-48.
26. See, e.g., Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and
Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. L. Rav. 417 (1976).
27. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d at 1260; International Harvester Co.
v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d at 629-31, 649; Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d at
1016.
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vague, undefined public good." 2 A result likely to flow from
this development is that litigants, industrial and environmental alike, now will find it more difficult to forestall agency
action through obstructionist legal tactics."
Aeschliman v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The second portion of the Vermont Yankee decision reviews the court of appeals decision in Aeschliman v. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.3 Aeschliman arose out of a 1969 petition by Consumers Power Company for a permit to construct
two nuclear reactors in Michigan. Various intervenors opposed
the petition because they considered the agency's environmental impact statement (EIS) inadequate.3 '
Among other objections, the intervenors claimed that the
EIS section on alternatives failed to consider the alternative of
energy conservation. The Commission's appeal board upheld
the Commission's decision to grant the permits because the
proposed alternative fell outside the "rule of reason" standard
3
set forth in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton,"
and therefore did not have to be considered. Under this standard, agencies are not required to consider remote or speculative alternatives. The appeal board found that, in view of what
it considered a lack of evidence documenting the practicality
and effectiveness of the conservation alternative, the alternative was speculative."
Judge Bazelon, again writing for the court of appeals, rejected the "rule of reason" standard as the proper threshold
test for determining whether an alternative must be considered. After citing a long line of NEPA cases which have placed
the burden on the agency to investigate all proffered alternatives, he stated: "[A]n intervenor's comments on a draft EIS
raising a colorable alternative not presently considered therein
must only bring 'sufficient attention to the issue to stimulate
28. 435 U.S. at 549.
29. The Court's focus on procedural issues left unresolved the important substantive issue of whether radioactive wastes will cause unacceptable environmental
harm when stored or reprocessed. Thus, on remand, the court of appeals now must
consider whether the government's position in this regard is justified.
30. 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
31. See id. at 625.
32. In re Consumers Power Co., ALAB-123, RAI-73-5-331 (May 18, 1973), citing
from Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
33. Id.
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the Commission's consideration of it."'"' Applying this line of
reasoning, Judge Bazelon found the Commission's rejection of
the energy conservation alternative to be arbitrary and capricious and inconsistent with NEPA's mandate to the Commission.3 5
The Supreme Court, in reversing the court of appeals, disagreed more with Judge Bazelon's application of his conclusions to the facts of the case than with his interpretation of
NEPA or his rejection of the "rule of reason" standard. Justice
Rehnquist stated that the Commission's decision must be evaluated in terms of the information it had at the time it made
its decision. Intervenors, he stated, must at least alert the
Commission to their position and contentions:
Common sense . . . teaches us that the "detailed statement of alternatives" cannot be found wanting simply because the agency failed to include every alternative device
and thought conceivable by the mind of man. Time and
resources are simply too limited to hold that an impact
statement fails because the agency failed to ferret out
every possible alternative, regardless of how uncommon or
unknown that alternative may have been at the time the
project was approved. 6

In this case, the Commission acted prior to the emergence of

public concern with the "energy crisis" and before it had formally ruled that its licensing board must consider conservation
alternatives."' Moreover, its decision was rendered prior to the
time that the Council on Environmental Quality guidelines for
agency implementation of NEPA required consideration of
conservation as an alternative.3 Thus, while accepting Judge
34. 547 F.2d at 628 (quoting Indiana & Mich. Elect. Co. v. FPC, 502 F.2d 336,
339 (1974)).
35. Id. at 629.
36. 435 U.S. at 551. Justice Rehnquist states earlier in the opinion that "[t]o
make an impact statement something more than an exercise in frivolous boilerplate
the concept of alternatives must be bounded by some notion of feasibility." Id. (emphasis added).
37. 435 U.S. at 552.
38. Council on Environmental Quality guidelines that suggested the need to
incorporate energy conservation considerations in environmental impact statements
did not appear until August 1, 1973. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(a)(4) (1976); 38 Fed. Reg.
20550, 20554 (1973). It should be noted, however, that the intervenor's brief to the
Court pointed out that the Commission had repeatedly testified to Congress, as early
as two years prior to the preparation of the Consumers Power EIS, that the Commission had recognized its statutory obligation to consider this alternative when processing permit and license applications. Consumers Power Co. v. Aeschliman, No. 76-528,
Brief for Respondents at 38.
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Bazelon's proposition that intervenors need only raise a
"colorable alternative" to trigger Commission consideration,
Justice Rehnquist nofietheless found that "in light of the facts
available [to the Commission]" its action was not arbitrary or
capricious:
[T]he role of a court in reviewing the sufficiency of an
agency's consideration of environmental factors is a limited one, limited both by the time at which the decision
was made and by the statute mandating review.3
The Supreme Court also rejected an alternative ground
offered by the court of appeals for its judgment in Aeschliman.
The court of appeals remanded the report of the Commission's
4°
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) because
the court found that the report's use of technical jargon and its
oblique reference to "other problems" raised in previous reports failed to inform the public of the safety or hazards of the
proposed facilities.
The Supreme Court, however, determined that the public
disclosure function of the ACRS Report was subordinate to its
principal function of assisting the Commission. Justice
Rehnquist complained that it would border on the
"Kafkaesque" for a reviewing court to invalidate a licensing
determination after the passage of seven years "because one
report refers to other problems . . . discussed at length in other
reports available to the public."" To do so would interfere with
the choice of Congress to "at least try nuclear energy [as an
alternative]" under a review process "inwhich courts are to
play only a limited role."'" The tenor, if not the precise holding,
of Aeschliman strongly suggests that the Supreme Court will
look with disfavor on any future interference by the appellate
courts in the nuclear licensing process.
Conclusion
Vermont Yankee's greatest significance lies in its reversal
of the trend, especially apparent in the District of Columbia
39. 435 U.S. at 555.

40. The ACRS is required to review each construction permit application for the
purpose of informing the Commission of the "hazards of proposed or existing reactor
facilities and the adequacy of proposed reactor safety standards.... 42 U.S.C. §
2039 (1976).
41. 435 U.S. at 557.
42. Id. at 558.
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Circuit, toward requiring rulemaking procedures that are more
elaborate than those required by section 553 of the APA when
complex and sensitive issues of great public importance are
involved. The decision also is significant in that it provides the
first definitive interpretation of what alternatives an agency
must consider under NEPA. To the extent that the decision
reaffirms the threshold test employed by the court of appeals,
the decision may provide benefits to the environmentalists
who, at least nominally, were the losers in this case.
Allan F. Wichelman

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-FEDERAL REVIEW OF
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY DECISION UNDER
THE NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM IS ONLY AVAILABLE WHEN OFFICIAL
EPA ACTIONS ARE INVOLVED-Shell Oil Co. v. Train,*
585 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978).
Shell Oil Company operates an industrial complex composed of a petroleum refinery and an organic chemical manufacturing plant near Martinez, California. In June, 1971, Shell
applied to the California Regional Water Quality Control
Board (California Regional Board) for a permit to discharge
pollutants into the navigable waterways adjacent to the facility. However, between the filing of the application and the
California Regional Board's action, Congress created the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES),'
empowering the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to issue discharge permits regulating the
nature and quantity of various wastes. Although states were
urged to establish and administer their own discharge programs, the state programs required approval by the Administrator of the EPA.2 In addition, the EPA retained a veto power
over any state discharge permit granted.3
California adopted a program in compliance with the
NPDES under which the California Regional Water Quality
Control Board was given the responsibility for carrying out the
directives.' Under the new directives, the Board reviewed
Shell's application in October, 1974, and classified the complex
as a Class "E" refinery. Shell then sought a variance to the
classification in order to operate under Class "D" guidelines,5
asserting that their plant was "fundamentally different" from
other complexes given the same classification. The effect of a
Class "D" rather than a Class "E" classification is generally
© 1979 by Stephen D. Pahl.
In his official capacity as the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency.
1. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976).
2. Id. § 1342(b).
3. Id. § 1342(d)(2).
4. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13370-13389 (West Supp. 1978); 39 Fed. Reg. 26,061
(1974).
5. The EPA has produced a guideline (Effluent Guidelines and Standards) for
both types of plants in Shell's complex which classifies them from "A" to "E" in
increasing order of complexity. 40 C.F.R. § 419.10-.56 (1974).
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that the former allows a larger discharge of pollutants using
factors such as the size of the manufacturing plant and the
processes used.' The California Regional Board, after receiving
the EPA's opinion recommending rejection of the application,
denied the variance.'
Shell appealed the denial of the variance to three forums:
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
under its power to review actions by an administrator of a
federal agency; 8 to the State Water Resources Control Board
under its power to review the denial by the Board;9 and to the
federal district court, contending that the EPA's "advice" constituted federal action reviewable in that court. The Ninth
Circuit held that it had no jurisdiction since there had been no
act by the Administrator of the EPA. The State Water Resources Board affirmed the Class "E" refinery classification
but reversed the variance issue, leaving only the appeal to the
federal district court.
Judge Robert Peckham dismissed Shell's complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 0 Holding that the EPA had
only informally advised the California Regional Board regarding the variance and thus had not been the catalyst for the
behind-the-scenes coercion as Shell alleged, the court concluded that there existed no federal action: therefore, the EPA
was not a proper party in the litigation."
In affirming the district court, the Ninth Circuit, Judge
Hufstedler speaking for the majority, held that the actions of
the EPA in advising the California Regional Board did not
"transform the state agency action into federal agency action
reviewable in federal court."'" The court's analysis focused on
the advisory capacity the EPA was intended to hold under the
NPDES and the prior judicial construction the Clean Water
Act had received by the federal courts.
6. Environmental Protection Agency Development Document No. 440-1/73-014
(April, 1974) (Summary and conclusions of document on file at Santa Clara Law

Review).
7. Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d 408, 411 (1978).
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F) (1976). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Shell's petition, holding that the denial was "not an act of the Administrator
of the EPA such as would give this Court jurisdiction." Shell Oil Co. v. Train; No. 752070 (9th Cir., Sept. 30, 1975).
9. California Regional Water Quality Control Board, Order No. 75-11 (1975).
Appeals of this type are authorized by CAL. WATER CODE § 13320(a) (West Supp. 1978).
10. Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
11. 415 F. Supp. at 77-78.
12. 585 F.2d at 413.
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The majority noted that the NPDES was simply another
form of federal-state cooperative federalism, and "the concept
of undue influence and duress was inappropriate in this context." Furthermore, when dealing with administrative agencies implementing federal programs directly regulating the
states, the court found that ongoing federal-state consultations
are necessary in order to achieve compliance with the programs.
In its argument, Shell relied on Washington v. Environmental ProtectionAgency," in which the Administator of the
EPA had vetoed an NPDES permit issued to the Scott Paper
Company by the state of Washington. Scott filed suit in district
court challenging the Administrator's objections. On appeal,
jurisdiction was affirmed based on section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act,' 5 which recognizes the necessity for judicial review of an administrative agency's decisions when there
are no other adequate remedies. There is a clear difference
between Washington and Shell. In Washington, the EPA Administrator had officially vetoed the state agency's action; in
Shell, the Administrator had only recommended action. Distinguishing Washington in that manner and noting that advice
could not be equated with coercion, as alleged by Shell, the
court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.'"
The majority also determined that section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act was not applicable. That section
limits review to "final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy in a court. . . ." 7 As the California Regional
Board's decision was subject to modification by the California
State Water Resources Control Board or alternatively by the
California courts of general jurisdiction the court held that this
foreclosed review under the Act.
In his dissent, Judge Wallace argued that there was no
substantial difference between the case at bar and Washington
v. EPA. 18 In this instance, he stated, the Administrator informally controlled the terms by which an NPDES permit was
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 414.
573 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1978).
5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
585 F.2d at 412-13.
5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976), discussed at 585 F.2d at 414.
585 F.2d at 419.
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granted by compelling the California Regional Board to reject
Shell's request. The distinction he noted was that in
Washington the Administrator vetoed the permit directly and
formally but his action here was indirect and informal. Therefore, he contended, the limitations described in the permit were
actually determined by the EPA; and under Washington, Shell
also should be able to obtain federal jurisdiction.
Additionally, the dissent contended that the complaint
should not have been disposed of summarily. Since the complaint asserted that the EPA was directly involved in the denial
of the variance and the district court was required to take these
averments as true, the dissenting opinion maintained that, as
under the Washington holding in which the EPA also exercised
should have proceeded to be dedirect action, the complaint
0
cided on the merits.
Shell Oil Co. v. Train clearly establishes that only official
actions taken by the EPA when dealing with state-issued
NPDES permits will be reviewable in federal court. Even when
the Administrator's advice is the controlling factor in the
state's decision regarding a permit, appellants will be required
to exhaust state administrative and judicial procedures before
gaining standing in federal courts.
An interesting sidelight occurred while the jurisdictional
aspect of this decision was being appealed in the federal courts.
After the California State Water Resources Control Board affirmed the classification of Shell's complex as a Class "E"
refinery but reversed the denial of the variance, 0 the EPA
Administrator filed a formal veto to the variance." That action
permitted Shell to obtain federal jurisdiction under Washington. However, no appeal was subsequently filed and the
period for bringing such action expired. Therefore, Shell is
still required to operate under Class "E" guidelines.
Stephen D. Pahl
19. Id. at 418.
20. In the Matters of the Petition of Shell Oil Company for Review of Orders Nos.
75-11 and 77-6, California Water Resources Control Board, Order No. WQ 76-12 (Aug.
19, 1976).
21. Decision of the EPA Administrator regarding Cal. Water Resource- Control
Bd. Request for Approval of Alternative Effluent Limitation for Shell Oil Co., Martinez, Cal., pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 419.52. Cal. State Bd., Order No. WQ 76-R EPA
Variance FDF, 76-09 (June 30, 1978).

